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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to find out whether a permanent layoff announcement given 
in the Finnish stock market cause a stock price reaction. More importantly this study 
aims to research whether the stock price reaction is different across industries. The cho-
sen industries - technology, manufacturing, and consumption goods and services - cover 
three quarters of all the companies listed in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange 
when measured by daily trading volume. Additionally, the differences in abnormal re-
turns between business cycles are researched. 
 
The data consists of 257 permanent layoff announcements given by 66 companies oper-
ating in one of the three industries under observation. Share prices' development was 
observed during investigation period of 2006–2011. An event study methodology is 
used to investigate the share price reactions caused by permanent layoffs. Abnormal re-
turns are examined for 11 days - four days before the announcement day and six days 
after it. 
 
Permanent layoff announcements do not cause statistically significant stock price reac-
tions when the whole sample is considered. Inter-industry differences do exist in the 
Finnish market. When studying industries separately, the technology portfolio was the 
only industry that did not react to layoff announcements. The differences in abnormal 
returns between service-oriented companies and manufacturing companies were also 
examined and the results showed that service-oriented companies face slightly more 
negative reaction than manufacturing companies. Different economical situations did 
affect investors' reactions to layoff announcements. Layoffs given during downturn pe-
riods did cause a more negative stock price reaction compared to ones given during up-
turn periods. 
 
KEYWORDS: Permanent layoff announcements, market reaction, inter-industry dif-
ferences, event study methodology 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Finland is for the second time in a short period of time within the throes of change. Pro-
longed economic downturn began in 2007, although the deep recession during the early 
1990s is still fresh in memory. After the recession in the early 1990s, Finland expe-
rienced almost a decade lasting exceptionally rapid economic growth, which resulted in 
a remarkable fall in the unemployment rate. Now the economic situation is recovering, 
but the unemployment rate has stayed somewhat the same for few years. 
 
The negotiations of the terminations during the prevailing downturn are continuing and 
even more workers are unemployed. In Finland alone between 2008 and 2011 the num-
ber of laid-off employees is exceedingly high. Companies are continuing negotiations 
regarding personnel reductions and even closing factories. However, according to Chen, 
Mehrotra, Sivakumar and Yu (2001) corporate layoffs are a rational and reasoned deci-
sion, which aims to ensure the company's survival in the future. Figure 1 below illu-
strates the redundancy of personnel amounts from the beginning of 2006 to the end of 
2011 in all companies in Finland. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The number of laid-off employees in Finland. (Suomen ammattiliittojen 
keskusjärjestö.) 
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Certain studies (see, eg. Worrell, Davidson and Sharma 1991 and Chen et al. 2001) 
show that a company giving a layoff announcement has an impact on the company's 
market value -usually a negative impact, to be precise. The lowest stock returns are of-
ten attached to a situation where the layoffs are resulting from a fall in demand. The 
market reaction caused by a layoff announcement may vary between different time pe-
riods, and therefore the latest data may reveal a new way of share price behavior around 
the notice of termination. The stock market reaction consequent upon a layoff an-
nouncement may be particularly affected by the general economic situation. Farber and 
Hallock (2009) discovered that the number of layoff announcements follow the business 
cycle quite closely. Investors' differing views on corporate announcements during eco-
nomical upturn and downturn periods may lead to diverging results. In addition, the re-
sults obtained in the different periods may also be associated with the stock market situ-
ation then. 
 
Fama (1970) has defined the efficient market hypothesis whereby the market is said to 
be informatively efficient, if the stock prices reflect immediately and completely all 
available information. According to the efficient market hypothesis, investors are unable 
to take advantage of any information obtained from the market to earn abnormal returns. 
However the previous studies presented in this thesis as well as the empirical findings 
from the Finnish stock market show that it is possible to achieve abnormal returns 
around a company’s layoff announcement. 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to find out does a final layoff announcement given in the 
Finnish stock market have an effect on stock prices. Especially the main point of view is 
to examine whether there are differences in stock market reactions between different 
industries and between different economical business cycles. The chosen industries - 
technology, manufacturing, and consumption goods and services - represent 78 percent 
of all the companies listed in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange when meas-
ured by daily trading volume. Two downturn and two upturn periods are derived from 
the investigation period of 2006–2011. 
 
The previous studies' research results build a basis for this thesis and the findings are 
used as indicators of what to expect from the empirical part. The hypotheses are con-
structed based on the results from the previous studies made within the subject. Most of 
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the studies presented in this thesis investigated how layoff announcements impact stock 
returns in the U.S. market. This study utilizes Finnish data providing Finnish evidence 
about the stock price reactions caused by final layoff announcements. 
 
Moreover, the realization concerning semi-strong form of market efficiency by Fama 
(1970) is observed. A final layoff announcement provides a new piece of information to 
the market and it should cause a positive or a negative price reaction depending on how 
investors interpret the content of the new information. In order for the semi-strong form 
to fulfill, the new piece of information should be adapted into the share prices without a 
delay. If abnormal returns occur after the announcement day, it implies that the market 
is inefficient. Consequently, abnormal returns before the event day indicate that the in-
vestors were maybe able to predict the date of the announcement or that there was an 
information leakage. 
 
The first hypothesis is built in order to find out does a final layoff announcement cause 
a stock price reaction in the Finnish market. According to several studies (see, eg. Wor-
rell, Davidson and Sharma 1991, Gunderson, Verma and Verma 1997, Chen, Mehrotra, 
Sivakumar and Yu 2001) layoff announcements have a negative impact on a company's 
share price. Due to the aforementioned empirical finding it is justifiable to assume that a 
final layoff announcement causes negative abnormal return. Based on this finding the 
first hypothesis is built and it tests whether a final layoff announcement causes a stock 
price reaction in the Finnish stock market. 
 
H1: H0: A final layoff announcement does not cause a stock price reaction. 
 
 H1: A final layoff announcement causes a negative stock price reaction. 
 
The second hypothesis is related to the stock price reaction and the difference in a mar-
ket reaction's magnitude between companies operating in different industries. For ex-
ample Worrell, Davidson and Sharma (1991) and Elayan, Swales, Maris and Scott 
(1998) have studied the differences in market reactions caused by layoff announcements 
across industries. However, their findings do not support each other. Elayan et al. found 
a significant difference in the market reaction whereas Worrell et al. did not find evi-
dence for the matter. The approach to the subject was different as Elayan et al. focused 
on finding the differences between service-oriented companies and manufacturing com-
panies where Worrell et al. studied the differences between eight industries. 
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This study focuses on finding differences in market reactions from three industries: 
technology, manufacturing, and consumption goods and services. These industries were 
chosen because they cover the majority (78 percent) of the total market share of all the 
listed companies in the OMX Helsinki stock exchange when measured by daily trading 
volume. Furthermore, both the technology industry and the consumption goods and ser-
vices industry provide various services to customers. These two industries include ser-
vice-oriented companies which relies strongly on human capital whereas the companies 
in the chosen manufacturing industry rely highly on physical capital. As the scientific 
approach industry-wise in this study simulates Elayan et al.'s (1998) division for com-
panies operating in the service and manufacturing industry the second hypothesis is 
build with expectations to find differences in market reactions between chosen three in-
dustries. 
 
H2: H0: Stock price reactions caused by final layoff announcements do not dif-
fer between industries. 
 
H1: Stock price reactions caused by final layoff announcements are differ-
ent between industries. 
 
The third hypothesis is built in order to test whether the stock price reaction due to a 
final layoff announcement is affected by different economical situations. Previous stu-
dies (see, eg. Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen 1995 and Chatrath, Ramchander & Song 
1995) indicate that different economical stages may have an impact on stock price reac-
tion caused by a final layoff announcement. Elayan et al. (1998) found that a layoff an-
nouncement during downturn period is associated with a more negative market reaction 
compared to one during upturn period. Based on the finding made by Elayan et al. the 
last hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H3: H0: Stock price reactions caused by final layoff announcements do not dif-
fer between different business cycles. 
 
 H1: Final layoff announcements given during economical downturn pe-
riods cause more negative stock price reactions compared to ones given 
during upturn periods. 
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1.2. Contribution of the study 
 
The contribution of this study is to provide support for the previous studies that have 
researched share price reactions caused by layoff announcements. Most of the studies 
presented in this thesis are made with U.S. market data except for two with Canadian 
market data. This thesis provides evidence based on the Finnish data about the layoff 
announcements’ effect on stock prices. This study focuses on comparing the market 
reaction's magnitude caused by a permanent layoff announcement across industries. 
Technology, manufacturing, and consumption goods and services industries are under 
observation. For example Worrell et al. (1991) and Elayan et al. (1998) studied the in-
ter-industry differences. This study's approach to the subject retells the scientific ap-
proach used by Elayan et al. Moreover, this study tests whether different business cycles 
have an effect on how investors react to final layoff announcements. Ursel and 
Armstrong-Stassen (1995) and Chatrath et al. (1995) have stated that different economi-
cal situations may affect the market reaction caused by a layoff announcement. The in-
vestigation period of 2006–2011 includes two upturn periods and two downturn periods. 
 
 
1.3. Structure of the study 
 
This thesis is divided into six main chapters and it includes both theoretical and empiri-
cal parts. This thesis started with an introduction to the subject and it is followed by the 
second chapter which presents some of the previous studies made about the layoff an-
nouncements' effect on stock prices. The main research results are presented in order to 
build a basis for the empirical part. The third chapter introduces the basis of the finan-
cial markets. As well the efficient market hypothesis is covered and three deviations 
from the market efficiency are introduced. The empirical part of this thesis starts from 
the fourth chapter. It reviews the data and its classification used in the study and the 
event study methodology used to obtain the research results. The fifth chapter presents 
the empirical findings and it is finally followed by the conclusions. 
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2. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
Previous studies show that the notice of termination has an impact on the company's 
stock price. This phenomenon is based on the fact that layoffs are considered as a kind 
of an indicator of the company's overall performance and financial situation. Nowadays 
corporate layoffs are very common but the subject has been under observation longer. 
The most significant studies concerning layoff announcements and their impact on 
company's performance were published in the 1990s. In this chapter previous studies 
and their main findings are presented in order to build a basis for this study. 
 
 
2.1. Layoff announcements and market reaction 
 
Worrell, Davidson and Sharma (1991) were the first ones to study financial and strateg-
ic aspects of layoff announcements. Their study was groundbreaking as there were no 
prior theoretical or empirical studies made about financial consequences of layoff an-
nouncements. In their study Worrell et al. investigated how corporate layoffs affect the 
U.S. securities market. The data consisted of 194 layoff announcements and they were 
divided based on the reasons given for the layoffs into two groups: layoffs due to finan-
cial distress and restructuring. Worrell et al. found statistically significant proof that the 
market response to layoff announcements is negative. The cited reason affected to the 
magnitude of the reaction. The reaction was stronger when layoffs were attributed to 
financial distress compared to restructuring. Also large and permanent layoffs caused a 
more negative market reaction compared to small and temporary layoffs. 
 
Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995) provide evidence about the market performance 
outside the U.S. market as they explored how shareholders react to layoff announce-
ments in the Canadian stock market. The data sample consisted of 137 layoff an-
nouncements from 57 companies over the time period of January 1989 to August 1992. 
They found supporting evidence of layoff announcement's effect in the Canadian market 
as Worrell et al found from the U.S. which indicated that shareholders respond to a 
layoff announcement in their company negatively. Especially shareholders reacted more 
negatively to a company's initial layoff announcement compared to following layoff an-
nouncements. Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen's research results also support the findings 
of Worrell et al. (1991) regarding that shareholders found large-scale layoffs more nega-
tive than small-scale layoffs. 
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Gunderson, Verma and Verma (1997) examined layoff announcements' relation to com-
panies' market values in the Canadian stock market over the time period of 1982–1989. 
The data sample consisted of 214 layoff announcements given by 84 companies. The 
results indicated that the market responded negatively to layoff announcements. The 
negative effect occurred almost always on the event day and the following day which 
implies that the market cannot predict the new information but it is still adapted quickly 
into the stock prices. It seemed that the market is capable of separating the bad news 
from the good news based on the information's content given in conjunction with the 
layoff announcement. The market reaction was positive in anticipatory layoffs such as 
in attempts to stabilize functions and negative in layoffs that signaled companies' fun-
damental difficulties such as inadequate demand or profits. The market response was 
more negative in layoffs that concerned the whole workforce related to partial layoffs. 
The market reaction was consistent for layoffs of definite and indefinite duration. 
 
Like Worrell et al. also Palmon, Sun and Tang (1997) studied whether the cited reason 
in the layoff announcement affects the stock market reaction. They classified the layoffs 
into two categories: layoffs related to efficiency-enhancing and to declining demand. 
The data covered 140 layoff announcements, which occurred in the U.S. market through 
the years of 1982–1990. The researchers found out that the market reaction was nega-
tive for the companies who gave an employee notice because of weakening demand, 
while the reaction was positive for the companies who laid off employees due to im-
proved efficiency. Another important finding was that there was a negative market reac-
tion between the scale of layoff and stock return for the companies who cited the reason 
due to weakening demand. 
 
Palmon et al. (1997) extended their research by studying the financial performance of 
the layoff announcing companies for three years before and three years after the layoff 
event. The results suggested that the cited reasons provide important information about 
how shareholders expect the announcement to reflect into companies' future profitabili-
ty. It is unclear why companies state a declining demand as a reason when announcing 
layoff even though investors find it as a negative information regarding the companies' 
profitability. It may be due to the fact that management's reputation could suffer if they 
give misleading information about the layoff reasons.  
 
Elayan, Swales, Maris and Scott (1998) claim that a market reaction caused by a layoff 
announcement may depend on the available information to shareholders and on the fi-
nancial performance of the company. They had built two hypotheses based on the mar-
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ket reaction to layoffs: the efficiency hypothesis and the declining investment opportun-
ities hypothesis. In addition, they studied the layoffs' characteristics and their ability to 
increase the efficiency of the company and its labor force. Their research provided a 
broader evidence from the U.S. stock market as the data set consisted of 646 layoff an-
nouncements from 1979 to 1991. 
 
Elayan et al. (1998) found similar results as Worrell et al. (1991) and Palmon et al. 
(1997). On average the market reaction to layoffs was significantly negative for the 
whole sample. Elayan et al. stated that the response may be negative because a layoff 
decision can be seen as a cause for weaker investment or growth opportunities, or less 
potential future cash flow development. For the declining investment opportunities hy-
pothesis the results were consistent contrary to efficiency hypothesis. As for the increas-
ing efficiency, layoffs did increase efficiency among labor force. 
 
Chen, Mehrotra, Sivakumar and Yu (2001) studied the relationship between layoffs and 
shareholder wealth ratio, and the company's post-layoff performance. The study used a 
sample of 349 layoff announcements from the U.S. market covering the years 1990–
1995. As for example Palmon et al. (1997) also Chen et al. (2001) found clear evidence 
that the stock market reacted negatively to the corporate announcement concerning 
layoffs. 
 
Chen et al. (2001) broadened the classification of layoffs by dividing the announce-
ments into four groups: layoffs attributed to cost cutting, demand decline, low prior 
earnings and restructuring. The researchers reported that the most significant negative 
market reaction was in companies who attributed layoffs to weak demand. This finding 
is consistent with the results obtained by Palmon et al. (1997). Layoffs due to restructur-
ing caused no statistically significant reaction. The results also showed that layoff an-
nouncements were usually preceded by a period of poor stock market and profit perfor-
mance. According to Chen et al. corporate layoffs are, however, a rational and reasoned 
decision, which aims to ensure the company's survival in the future. 
 
Hahn and Reyes (2004) investigated stock market responses to layoff announcements 
that affected over 1000 employees. The limitation was made in order to involve only 
economically significant layoff announcements to the sample. Investigation period 
comprised of 78 layoffs that met the required limitation in the U.S. market between 
1995 and 1999. Furthermore, Hahn and Reyes categorized the sample into layoffs attri-
buted to low demand and restructuring. The researchers found that a stock market reac-
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tion around a layoff announcement was negative to layoffs due to low demand. Con-
trary to prior studies (see Elayan et al. 1998 and Chen et al. 2001) they found that on the 
layoff announcement day the market responded significantly positively to layoffs due to 
restructuring. The difference in the results was due to different economic situations dur-
ing the investigation period. Aubsiness cycle aspect to layoffs is discussed later in this 
chapter where the reasons for this difference are covered. 
 
Farber and Hallock (2009) also examined if the share prices respond to the layoff an-
nouncements. Their study differs from the earlier researches presented in this thesis by 
its scale of the material. The data covered the years from 1970 to 1999 and it consisted 
of 4273 layoff announcements given by 1160 large U.S. companies. Farber and Hallock 
made several observations from their extensive material and discovered that the number 
of layoff announcements follow the business cycle quite closely. In addition, during the 
early years of the time period under observation stock price distribution was negative, 
but as the time period reaches its end share price changes are not as radical. One possi-
ble explanation is that as the decades go by the layoffs related to the company's effi-
ciency improvements have become more general relative to the layoff announcements 
related to decreased demand. 
 
The study also documented that the layoff announcements, which are given at the same 
time as other public notices, had a smaller absolute effect on the share price than a sin-
gle layoff announcement. The cited reason in the layoff announcement, the industry, or 
an additional factor did not explain the change that occurred over the decades, during 
which the impact of the layoff announcement on the share price declined. (Farber & 
Hallock 2009.) 
 
 
2.2. Layoff announcements between industries 
 
The market reaction caused by a layoff announcement may depend upon the characteris-
tics of the industry in which the company is operating as well as whether the company 
functions in manufacturing or service industry. A service-oriented companies, which 
rely strongly on human capital, face a more negative market reaction compared to other 
industries, which rely heavily on physical assets. (Elayan et al. 1998.) 
 
In their study Elayan et al. (1998) found out that the market reaction was significantly 
different when comparing layoff announcements across industry types. The results 
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pointed out that layoff announcements by companies operating in the manufacturing 
industry cause a smaller market reaction relative to layoffs in banking and other finan-
cial institution companies. It can be concluded that service-oriented companies are more 
vulnerable to a change in human capital than manufacturing companies. Industry differ-
ences were also studied by Worrell et al. (1991) who tried to find differences in eight 
industries: aerospace, electronics, petroleum, banking, steel/metal, telecommunications, 
media, and transportation. Statistically significant differences in share price reactions 
caused by a layoff announcement between chosen industries were not found. 
 
Ranganathan & Samant (2006) noted that there is a lack of studies that try to explain the 
reasons for massive number of IT personnel layoff announcements even though there is 
an increasing industry concern over the matter. The researchers studied the trends in 569 
information technology layoffs given by 417 companies in the U.S. market for two 
years 2000 and 2001. Their descriptive study revealed that the most common reasons 
for announcing layoffs were a need for cost cutting and to enhance productivity as well 
as restructuring. The financial environment of companies downsizing IT employees was 
good and even on the increase but they had severe problems in cost controlling as they 
performed worse cost-wise than their competitors. 
 
Goins and Gruca (2008) stated that a company's reputation among employees and inves-
tors suffer when the company announces a significant permanent layoff. Goins and 
Gruca examined how one company's layoff announcement affects the reputation of oth-
er companies operating in the same industry. The study reviewed 71 layoff announce-
ments given by 30 companies operating in the U.S. oil and gas industry during years 
1989–1996. Share price changes of rival companies were used as an indicator to interp-
ret how a layoff announcement given by one company within the same industry reflects 
to competitors' reputation.  
 
The result were in line with the most of the presented layoff announcement studies as it 
showed that the mean reaction caused by a company's layoff announcement was some-
what negative but not in this case statistically significant. According to the findings, one 
company announcing a layoff did have an impact on rival companies in the industry. If 
the market reaction for the announcing company was negative, it was also seen as bad 
news for the whole industry. A positive reaction, on the other hand, for the company 
announcing the layoff was considered as positive information for the other companies 
as well. In addition, as the layoffs became a widely recognized phenomenon within the 
industry, the greater the negative reaction among other companies operating in the same 
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industry was. However, the close competitors were not exposed to such great negative 
impact as the layoff announcing company did. (Goins & Gruca 2008.) 
 
Cagle, Sen and Pawlukiewicz (2009) claimed that there are few studies made about the 
layoff announcements by financial institutions and yet most of those studies limit the 
sample of financial institutions to cover only banks. In their study Cagle et al. took into 
account the layoff announcements given by banks and non-bank financial institutions 
which are bank holding companies, security brokers and dealers, non-bank financial 
holding companies, mortgage banks, non-bank depository institutions, insurers, and 
other non-depository institutions not classified elsewhere. 
 
Cagle et al. (2009) examined inter-industry differences in market reactions caused by 
layoff announcements. The data consists of all layoff announcements made by financial 
institutions covering the time period from 1994 to 2003. Cagle et al. found out that 
banks cause a more positive stock price reaction than other types of regulated compa-
nies. They concluded that the results prove that bank regulation reduces asymmetric in-
formation surrounding layoff announcements to a greater extent than the regulation of 
other types of financial institutions. 
 
 
2.3. Layoff announcements during business cycles 
 
Layoffs and their causes are assumed to be a function of the business cycle. During the 
recession when economic activities have contracted companies lay off their employees 
in expectation of lower earnings and bad performance. Instead during the economic 
boom period companies' layoff announcements can be seen as an effort to increase 
company's efficiency. However, it is anticipated that market reaction to layoffs is more 
negative during the recession than during the boom period. (Elayan et al. 1998.) 
 
Elayan et al. (1998) found support for their hypothesis concerning the difference in 
market reaction during different economical situations. A more negative market reaction 
was caused when a company announced a layoff during the recessionary period com-
pared to an announcement given during the boom period. 
 
Chatrath, Ramchander & Song (1995) studied whether the market reacts differently to 
layoff announcements given during different business cycles. They noted that apart 
from firm-specific factors the general economical environment may affect investors' 
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reaction to layoff announcements. Layoffs during upturn periods were easily seen as an 
indicator that the company is in difficulties whereas the reasons for layoffs during 
downturn periods were seen as an aim to reorganize the company. The investigation pe-
riod ranging from 1981 to 1992 included one upturn period that took place in 1984–
1990 and two downturn periods that occurred in 1981–83 and 1991–1992. The data 
contained 231 U.S. corporate layoff announcements from which 56 were given during 
upturn period and 175 during downturn periods. According to the results, there was a 
significantly negative market reaction during the recessionary period in the early 1980s, 
and during the upturn period of 1984–1990. However, stock price reaction to layoffs 
given in the 1990s was significantly positive. These differences in reactions may indi-
cate structural changes in the U.S. labor market in the early 1990s. (Chatrath et al. 
1995.) 
 
Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995), whose main research results were covered earlier 
in this chapter, claimed that there may be a difference in shareholders' reactions to 
layoff announcements during recessionary and non-recessionary periods. They pre-
dicted that layoff announcements given during downturn periods were seen positively as 
a sign that companies are trying to reduce costs. Layoffs in upturn periods instead may 
indicate that the company is in grave difficulty. 
 
As reviewed previously in this chapter Hahn and Reyes (2004) discovered positive 
stock market reaction for layoffs that were attributed to restructuring. This finding dif-
fers from the earlier studies' results (see Elayan et al. 1998 and Chen et al. 2001) where 
layoffs due to restructuring did not cause statistically significant market reaction. Hahn 
and Reyes supposed that the difference between the restructuring results was gained be-
cause of the different investigation period choice. For example Chen et al. (2001) used 
years 1990–1995 in their study when the upturn period was in the early stage whereas 
Hahn and Reyes used years 1995–1999 when the expansion was more strong. Investors' 
pessimism during downturn periods and optimism during upturn periods causes differ-
ent expectations and responses to layoff announcements. Pessimism may lead to a more 
negative reaction during downturn period whereas during upturn period optimism may 
lead to a more favorable reaction. (Hahn & Reyes 2004.) 
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3. FINANCIAL MARKET EFFICIENCY AND PERFORMANCE 
 
According to Malkamäki (1989: 28), the main purpose of the financial markets is to ef-
ficiently direct the funds of the surplus sector as a commitment of equity and liability to 
the ones who have the need for the money i.e. the deficit sector. Financial markets are 
divided into two groups depending on the duration of the loan; short-term and long-term 
markets. A loan period lasting less than a year is considered short-term financing whe-
reas a loan period continuing over a year is defined as long-term financing. Short-term 
financing is transmitted at the money market and the credit market, while long-term fi-
nancing in turn is conveyed at the capital market. The money and the capital markets 
can also be divided according to whether the instrument is suitable for secondary market 
or not. Typical example of an instrument is a loan given by a bank in which the promis-
sory note is once purchased and after that it does not have liquid secondary market. 
Money market instruments, bonds and shares, however, are securities which investors 
can trade for example in the money market and stock exchange. (Schwartz 1988: 11–
12.) 
 
When examining the perfection of the functioning of financial markets it often concerns 
the long term financial markets i.e. capital markets. For perfect capital markets Copel-
and and Weston (1988: 330) set the following four conditions: 
 
1. Markets are smooth meaning there are no transaction costs or taxes on the 
market and all assets are fully distributable and for sale. Also there are no 
other restricting rules in the market.   
2. Commodities and securities markets are perfectly competitive. At the com-
modity market it means that all producers offer their products and services at 
the minimum cost. As for security markets all the participants trade at mar-
ket prices. 
3. Markets are informatively efficient; information is free and available simul-
taneously to all market participants. 
4. Individuals are all rational trying to maximize their own expected utility. 
 
If financial markets meet the conditions listed, they are said to be allocatively and ope-
rationally efficient. Operational efficiency deals with the transaction costs of assets as in 
the operationally efficient market transaction costs are assumed to be zero. In the alloca-
tively efficient market all the relevant information at the market reflects directly and 
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without delay in the prices of investment assets as the savings are directed optimally to 
productive investments. (Copeland & Weston 1988: 330–331.) 
 
According to Malkamäki (1989: 31), in reality, however, financial markets are not per-
fect but the existence of the theoretical framework has made it easier to research the 
field. Capital markets can perform effectively even though they do not fulfill all the as-
sumptions of a perfect market. 
 
In the beginning of this chapter, basis of the capital markets and the conditions of the 
perfect market were presented.  Next the role of new information in the financial mar-
kets is examined after which the efficient market hypothesis is introduced. Fama’s 
(1970) definition of the three forms of market efficiency is presented. In addition, two 
stock valuation models are introduced. 
 
 
3.1 The effect of new information in the financial markets 
 
In the financial market prices only change as new, relevant information comes to the 
market. However, in the efficient market share prices behave completely randomly 
meaning that the probability of price rise one day is equal to the probability that it falls. 
Thus the share prices change regardless of past performance. (Blake 2000: 392; Nikki-
nen, Rothovius & Sahlström 2002: 80–82.) Maurice Kendall (1953) was the first one to 
notice that no predictable pattern in stock prices could be identified. Kendall proposed a 
theory of random walk in which stock prices seemed to evolve fully coincidentally. 
 
At first Kendall’s results were interpreted as an implication of stock market irrationality. 
Soon, however, economists realized that random stock price movements are an indicator 
of a well-functioning market. If prices are to reflect all available information, price 
changes must appear only in response to new information. According to the definition 
of new information, price change must be unpredictable; if it could be predicted, then 
the prediction would be part of today’s information. Thus stock prices that change in 
consequence of new information also must move unpredictably. This is the essence of 
Kendall’s conclusion that the prices of stocks should follow a random walk. (Bodie, 
Kane & Marcus 2009: 344–345.) 
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Figure 2. Stock price reaction to new information in an efficient and inefficient market. 
(Haugen 1993: 643) 
 
 
In order for the financial markets to be efficient, security prices should react immediate-
ly to the new information as it is received. Market prices’ reaction should also be un-
biased. The primary reaction should reflect exactly the true implications of the informa-
tion on the value of the security without a need for later correction. There are three 
possible scenario presented in the figure 2 about how stock market price may react to a 
new piece of information. Consider positive information which is released on the day 0 
and a $3 increase on the value of the stock is expected. The solid line represents a stock 
reaction in an efficient market. The new piece of information is directly adopted into the 
price of the stock without further corrections. The broken line demonstrates a possible 
stock reaction in an inefficient market where market participants react slowly to the new 
information. Only a few investors initiate trading the stock in the first day which leads 
to a small increase in the price. After a lag of one or more days, brokers inform their 
clients that the current price of the stock is undervalued driving the price up to its new 
intrinsic value. The dotted line depicts another scenario in an efficient market where 
some investors who are over optimistic about the consequence of the information’s im-
pact on the value of the stock either get the information first or are prepared to act on it. 
These investors believe that the intrinsic value of the stock is more than $33, and their 
buying activity cause to drive the stock price above that level. Eventually the price falls 
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back to its correct level as other investors begin to sell their stock. (Haugen 1993: 642–
643.) 
 
If the market functions truly efficiently, neither the broken line nor dotted line scenarios 
should be possible in the real market (Haugen 1993: 643). Considering a layoff an-
nouncement given by a company it is a new piece of information in the financial mar-
ket. Previous studies show that markets do react to layoff announcements either posi-
tively or negatively for example depending on the reason given. Later empirical studies 
show how stock prices react to the release of a final layoff announcement in the Finnish 
stock market and whether there are differences in the market reactions across industries 
and business cycles. 
 
 
3.2 Efficient market hypothesis 
 
Eugene Fama (1970) has developed the efficient market hypothesis (later EMH) accord-
ing to which markets are said to be informatively efficient if all information available in 
the market and all information significant to determine the stock price are reflected im-
mediately and perfectly to the stock prices. Therefore EMH implies that not one of the 
market participants can take an advantage of any information available in their own in-
vestments to earn abnormal returns. (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 82.) However, financial mar-
ket efficiency has interested researchers and there are several piece of evidence that 
markets are not completely efficient. Anomalies or deviations from the market efficien-
cy are a proof that there is a possibility to earn abnormal returns in the financial market. 
 
EMH relative to the stock market can be divided into different levels depending on the 
quality of information under observation. Fama (1970) defined three forms of market 
efficiency as follows: 
 
1. In markets that fulfill the conditions of the weak form of market efficiency 
security prices reflect only all the information contained in the development 
of past prices which include price changes, trading volume and other market 
information.  
2. In the second level, the semi-weak form of market efficiency, all new pub-
lished information is immediately included into the security prices. Public 
information contains both all the information featured in the weak form of 
efficiency and for example shares profits and economy and politics news. 
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3. According to the strong form of market efficiency all the information includ-
ing both published and unpublished information is reflected in security pric-
es. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Three forms of market efficiency. 
 
 
Information efficiency, in the context of the weak form of market efficiency, means that 
there should be no correlation between past price changes and future price development 
because changes in the prices are independent of each other. As for in the case of the 
weak form market efficiency implies that as trading regulations are based on the past 
development of prices it is not possible to achieve net returns above average. (Reilly 
1989: 214.) Thus technical analysis, which examines the actual prices of the shares in 
order to find certain regularity, when used alone does not produce larger net income 
than normally (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 83). 
 
According to the semi-strong form of market efficiency, share prices include along with 
conditions of the weak form all the public information such as dividends, the published 
financial statement, new products and profit forecast (Blake 2000: 392). As the condi-
tions of the semi-strong form are met all new information relevant to the pricing of the 
securities is adopted immediately into the security prices. Thus positive news lead to an 
increase in the price and negative news are reflected in the market as a decrease in the 
                                     Strong form 
                 Semi-strong form 
 
      Weak-form 
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price. (Malkamäki 1989: 37.) When the markets are efficient stock price reactions show 
unambiguously the meaning of the published information. Fundamental analysis helps 
to interpret the conditions of the semi-strong form. The aim in the fundamental analysis 
is to determine the present value of the future cash flow of a stock. In practice the analy-
sis attempts to calculate the share price exploiting company’s equities and profit pros-
pects as well as forecasting the risk and interest level. (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 83.) The 
most challenging part of the fundamental analysis is to find companies that perform bet-
ter than everyone else estimates (Bodie et al. 2009: 351). 
 
As presented in the figure 3 above markets that fulfill the conditions of the strong form 
comprehend both the weak form and the semi-strong form as well as all the companies’ 
unpublished information i.e. monopolistic information. Naturally, it would be possible 
for insiders to earn superior profits by trading their own firm’s stock. Therefore it is 
fundamentally restricted by security market's law. The strong form also covers the as-
sumptions of the efficient market and the perfect market in which all information is 
available simultaneously to all market participants. However, economists have not been 
able to prove the realization of the strong form’s conditions in any financial market. 
(Reilly 1989: 215; Nikkinen et al. 2002: 83–84.) 
 
 
3.3 Stock valuation 
 
The expectations of a company’s future cash flows are reflected in the share price. If the 
cash flow expectations increase, the share price rises whereas the corresponding reduc-
tion in cash flow expectations lead to a decrease in the share price. Factors that are in-
dependent of a company may also have a distinct impact on the share price such as in-
flation, the overall situation in interests and exchange rate changes. All the factors men-
tioned reflect immediately into the prices of shares as the market is efficient. (Martikai-
nen 1995: 84–85.) 
 
3.3.1 The capital asset pricing model 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (later CAPM) is a model that is used to define the 
yield requirement of a share. According to the CAPM, stock returns should be deter-
mined on the basis of a systematic risk i.e. beta coefficient and a risk-free rate of return. 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) are considered as the developers of 
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the model. They based the CAPM on the modern portfolio theory introduced by Mar-
kowitz (1952).  
 
As mentioned before the CAPM states that the expected risk premium on each invest-
ment is proportional to its systematic risk. A share’s beta factor describes the response 
of the share’s returns to changes in the rates of return to the market portfolio which con-
sists of all risky investments in the financial market. According to equation 1, beta coef-
ficient is achieved by dividing the covariance between a share’s return and the market 
portfolio return by the variance of the market portfolio (Bodie et al. 2009: 113, 281.): 
 
(1)                      
  
 
where ri = rate of return of share i 
 rm = rate of return of the market portfolio 
   
The CAPM determines the yield of the investment as follows (Knüpfer & Puttonen 
2009: 148): 
 
(2)                         
 
where E (ri) = expected return on share i 
 rf = risk-free interest rate 
 βi = systematic risk on share i 
 E (rm) = expected return of the market portfolio 
 
As it is seen from the equation 2 the share’s yield is composed of two parts. The first 
part consists of a risk free interest rate and the second part is the risk premium of a 
share. The CAPM also provides an equation known as the security market line that 
represents the relationship between expected return and market risk. According to the 
CAPM, each stock should lie on the security market line because the highest returns on 
the specific risk level are earned on the line which concludes that the stocks are correct-
ly priced. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2006: 189.) Figure 4 illustrates the correlation be-
tween the risk of a stock and its expected rate of return. 
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Figure 4. The security market line. (Brealey & Myers 2003: 195) 
 
 
3.3.2 The arbitrage pricing theory 
 
While CAPM analyzes how investors construct efficient portfolios (1976), the Arbi-
trage Pricing Theory (later APT) developed by Stephen Ross approaches the subject 
from a different point of view. The APT is another commonly used equilibrium model 
which assumes that the return of every individual stock depends on more than one risk 
factor. (Brealey ym. 2006: 189.) According to the APT the expected return of a stock 
can be calculated as follows (Copeland & Weston 1988: 219): 
 
(3)                                   
 
where     = return on share i 
        = expected return on share i 
     = sensitivity of share i return to factor k 
     = value of factor k 
     = Unsystematic return on share i 
 
Equation 3 shows that the APT assumes that share’s return depends on two parts. The 
first part consists of macroeconomic factors and the second from events that are unique 
to every company. Unlike the CAPM which expects that share’s return depends only on 
Market portfolio 
Security market line 
Expected return 
on investment 
0.5 1.0 
beta β 
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its beta coefficient, APT believes that expected return of the share is dependent on a 
several different risk factors to whom also have to define its own beta coefficient. (Co-
peland & Weston 1988: 219–220.) 
 
There are two kinds of risk for any individual share. First is the risk caused by the ma-
croeconomic factors that cannot be eliminated by diversification. Another risk arises 
from possible events that are unique to all companies. However, unique risk can be 
eliminated by diversification. Share’s expected risk premium is only affected by ma-
croeconomic factors. The APT claims that the expected risk premium on a share de-
pends on the risk premium associated with each factor and sensitivity of a share to each 
of the factors b1, b2, … bk. Share’s expected risk premium π is gained as follows (Brea-
ley & Myers 2003: 205.): 
 
(4) π       
     =                                         
    
The arbitrage applies to well-diversified portfolios, where the unique risk has been elim-
inated by diversification. If the arbitrage pricing relation holds for all diversified portfo-
lios, it must hold as well for the individual shares. Therefore each share has to offer an 
expected return commensurate with its contribution to portfolio risk. According to the 
APT this contribution, in turn, depends on the sensitivity of the return of the share to 
unexpected changes in the macroeconomic factors. (Brealey & Myers 2003: 205.) 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter represents the data and the methodology used in this study. Event study is 
a common method used in the field of finance and this research methodology will also 
be used to obtain the empirical results in this study. Event study examines how a specif-
ic event impacts a share’s value on a specific point in time. 
 
 
4.1. Data description 
 
Data used in this study consists of 257 layoff announcements for permanent layoffs giv-
en in Finland from the beginning of January 2006 until the end of December 2011. Re-
search material is comprised of all the companies announcing layoffs within the investi-
gation period and operating in one of the chosen industries (technology, manufacturing, 
and consumption goods and services) as well as are listed in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. A criterion is that a company's daily trading volume has to be greater 
than 10 000 000 Euros for the whole investigation period. Limitation was made in order 
to eliminate the effect of low traded stocks. In addition, if a company has more than one 
series of shares in the market the more liquid share -i.e. the one with greater trading vo-
lume- is taken into account when calculating daily logarithmic returns. All the stocks 
used in this study are listed in appendix 1. 
 
Companies' announcements regarding the layoffs are gathered from Kauppalehti Online 
database, Taloussanomat Online and Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange. The total 
numbers of the layoff announcements are taken from the statistics of SAK (Suomen 
Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö). The daily stock market data and volumes were pro-
vided by the department of Accounting and Finance in University of Vaasa. In this 
study daily logarithmic returns are used for stocks and index. Daily logarithmic returns 
for stocks are calculated as follows (Vaihekoski 2004: 194): 
 
(5)         
   
     
  
 
where Rit = logarithmic return for share i 
 Pit = closing value for day t for share i 
 Pit-1 = closing value for share i preceding day t 
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Daily logarithmic returns for OMX Helsinki Cap index are also obtained utilizing equa-
tion 5. In order to define normal and abnormal returns OMX Helsinki CAP portfolio 
index is used as a market return. OMX Helsinki CAP index is a market value weighted 
index in which the maximum weight for a single stock is limited to ten percent. Overall 
OMX Helsinki CAP index is considered better indicator of a market return than OMX 
Helsinki general index because it includes same equities as OMX Helsinki index but is 
value weighted. (Vaihekoski 2004: 208–209.) 
 
This study focuses on three major industries announcing layoffs in the Finnish stock 
market: technology, manufacturing, and consumption goods and services. These three 
industries represent 78 percent of all the listed companies when measured by daily trad-
ing volume. Technology covers 47 percent, manufacturing covers 27 percent, and con-
sumption goods and services covers 4 percent of total market share. As said, the data 
sample consists of 257 layoff announcements given by 66 companies. In this study the 
companies are first divided into three portfolios according to which of the three indus-
tries they operate in. The layoff announcements are split between the industries in such 
a way that 146 of them were given in the manufacturing industry, 70 in the consumption 
goods and services industry, and the rest 41 of the layoffs in the technology industry. 
Figure 5 illustrates how the final layoff announcements are divided between the chosen 
industries and years under observation. 
 
 
Figure 5. Layoff announcements by industry during investigation period. 
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Once the division between industries is done, the companies that have given layoff an-
nouncements during the investigation period are also divided into portfolios according 
to the business cycle. These two splits support the hypotheses introduced in the first 
chapter of this thesis. Figure 6 illustrates how the final layoff announcements are di-
vided between industries and different business cycles. As it can be seen, there are more 
final layoffs given during upturn periods than during downturn periods. The majority of 
the layoff announcements are also given in the manufacturing industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Layoff announcements' split to upturn and downturn periods. 
 
 
In order to be able to generalize the results statistically it is required that there are 
enough observations (at least 30) from the chosen event. Generally it is considered to be 
desirable to have a sample of one hundred events. It is to be noted that there is a limited 
number of observations within technology industry when the split to business cycle 
portfolios are done. When using Finnish data as a research material it is in some cases 
inevitable that there are not as many observations as required and this is considered as a 
limitation in this study. (Vaihekoski 2004: 230, 237.) 
 
 
4.2. Event study methodology 
 
As mentioned earlier, when share prices reflect all currently available information, then 
new information in the market has to cause price changes. Therefore, the importance of 
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an event should be measured by investigating price changes during the time period in 
which the event occurs. An event study methodology enables to examine the impact of a 
specific event on a company’s share price. (Bodie et al. 2009: 353–534.) 
 
Normally an event study starts with a proxy for what stock returns would have been 
without the published event -that is a definition of the normal return or the expected re-
turn. The abnormal return caused by the event is evaluated as the difference between the 
actual return of a share and the return expected considering the performance of the mar-
ket. (Bodie et al. 2009: 354.)  
 
As far as it is known, the first published research which utilized event study methodolo-
gy was James Dolley's (1933) study about the price effects of stock splits. For the fol-
lowing 30 years starting from the early 1930s the knowledge of the event study grew 
and it was developed. In the late 1960s Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll (1969) introduced their groundbreaking methodology that is fundamentally the 
same as the one in use nowadays. (MacKinlay 1997: 13–14.) 
 
4.2.1. The six phases of event study 
 
There is no certain structure for the event study because several researchers have 
formed instructions about how to carry out an event study. However, the course of 
events are similar in the models. MacKinlay (1997) suggests the following structure of 
the event study: 
 
1. Defining the event and the event window 
2. Defining the criteria for selection of companies 
3. Defining the calculation method of the abnormal return 
4. Defining normal returns and estimation window 
5. Testing the statistical significance of the abnormal returns 
6. Presenting the empirical results 
 
Event study starts off with defining an event of interest and choosing a time period sur-
rounding the event over which the changes in share prices are observed. The event win-
dow can only include the announcement day of the event but it usually includes several 
days before and after the event. Wider event window enables a researcher to examine 
possible share price changes also surrounding the event. (MacKinlay 1997: 14–15.) In 
this study the event of interest is a company's final layoff announcement. The exact 
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event day (0) is a day when the company announces the final layoff. The development 
of the stock return is observed for eleven days starting four days before the announce-
ment and ending six days after. Figure 7 illustrates the time line of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Time line used in this study. 
 
 
After the first phase, the selection criteria needs to be defined. The choice of what com-
panies to include in the data and on what grounds has to be done. The restrictions for 
the data can be made by including companies that are listed in a specific stock exchange 
or have a certain characteristics (MacKinlay 1997: 15). This study utilizes Finnish stock 
data for years 2006–2011. Companies listed in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Ex-
change are included providing that the company announces layoff during the investiga-
tion period, operates in technology, manufacturing, or consumption goods and services 
industry, and has daily trading volume greater than 10 000 000 Euros for the whole in-
vestigation period. These three limitations are used in order to obtain the final data. 
 
In the third phase the calculation method for the abnormal return has to be chosen. The 
normal return is defined as the expected return when the event under observation does 
not take a place in the market. The abnormal return is obtained by deducting the normal 
return from the actual return. Mathematically the abnormal return is defined as follows 
(MacKinlay 1997: 15): 
 
(6) ARit = Rit - E(Rit) 
 
where ARit = abnormal return for share i for period of time t 
 Rit = actual return for share i for period of time t 
 E(Rit) = normal return for share i for period of time t  
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39 
 
The fourth step in the event study is to determine normal returns and estimation win-
dow. The estimation window is utilized when defining share's normal return and its pa-
rameters. Usually the estimation window covers 200–250 days prior to the event day. 
The event window itself is not normally included into the estimation window in order to 
avoid the event from affecting the results. (MacKinlay 1997: 15.) In this study the esti-
mation window covers 200 days starting 204 days prior to the event day and ending 4 
days before the announcement day, and the market model is used for calculating the 
normal return. The ways to define normal and abnormal returns are taken into closer 
examination in the next subtitle. 
 
Once the normal returns and estimation window have been defined, the abnormal re-
turns can be calculated and then the statistical significance of the abnormal return needs 
to be tested. In this part it is important to specify the hypotheses and to choose a method 
for aggregating the abnormal returns for all companies (MacKinlay 1997: 15). The sta-
tistical significance can be tested with a two sided t-test which will be presented later in 
this chapter. Finally, the last part in the event study is to present the empirical results 
and discuss about the findings. 
 
4.2.2. Defining expected and abnormal returns 
 
There are several models available to define the normal return of a share. The models 
can be divided into two categories: economic and statistical models. The economical 
models are not only based on statistical assumptions but also utilize assumptions con-
cerning investors' behavior whereas statistical models rely solely on statistical assump-
tions. Two common economic models are CAP-model and APT-model that are pre-
sented in the previous chapter. The presented statistical models in this study are the 
mean-adjusted return model and the market model. The statistical models are nowadays 
generally used in the event studies because biases observed with economic models can 
be eliminated by using the statistical models. (MacKinlay 1997: 17–19.) 
 
In the mean-adjusted return model the mean return of a share is assumed to be constant 
through time. In this model, the mean return is the expected return of a share and it is 
obtained by calculating the mean of share's actual daily returns from the estimation pe-
riod. The abnormal return using mean-adjusted return model can be calculated with the 
following equation (MacKinlay 1997: 15, 17.): 
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(7) ARit = Rit - Xi 
 
where Xi = the expected mean-adjusted return for share i 
 
Even though the mean-adjusted return model is the simplest model for calculating the 
normal return, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) claimed that the results did not usually 
differ significantly from the results yielded by using more sophisticated models. The 
reason is that the variance of the abnormal return is frequently not reduced a lot by us-
ing more complex model. (MacKinlay 1997: 17.) 
 
In this study the market model is used to obtain normal returns for all stocks. The mar-
ket model is commonly used for estimation of abnormal returns. The market model re-
lies on the assumption that there is a stable linear relation between the stock return and 
the market return. The linear specification of the model is based on the presumption that 
stock returns are normally distributed. The normal return in the market model is ob-
tained as follows (MacKinlay 1997: 15, 18.): 
 
(8) Rit  αi + βiRmt + εit 
 
where Rit = the normal return for share i during a given period of time t 
 αi and βi = parameters of the market model 
 Rmt = market portfolio's return during a given period of time t 
 εit = the zero mean disturbance term 
 
When E(εit = 0) and var(εit) = σ
2
εi , the market model can be shown as: 
 
(9) Rit  αi + βiRmt 
 
Compared to the mean-adjusted return model the market model includes an improve-
ment to the calculation of the normal return. The variance of the abnormal return is re-
duced as the part of the return that is related to variation in the market's return is re-
moved. As it can be seen from the equation 9, the market model is a one factor model. 
The parameters α and β in the market model are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(later OLS) regression. Once the OLS estimators for the estimation window are ob-
tained, the normal return and further the abnormal return for a share can be calculated 
(MacKinlay 1997: 18, 20.): 
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(10) ARit = Rit - αi - βiRmt 
 
In this study the estimation window starts 204 days before the event day and ends be-
fore the event window begins in order to avoid overlapping of the estimation window 
and the event window. OMX Helsinki CAP index is used as a market return. The rea-
sons for the choice of the market return are presented in the data description. The inter-
cept α and the slope coefficient β needed in the market model are achieved using OLS 
regression. The regression analysis is made with Microsoft Excel's Data Analysis Tool. 
 
Once the abnormal returns are calculated for all stocks using equation 10, the average 
abnormal return for each event window day can be calculated (Vaihekoski 2004: 232). 
Thus in this study the daily average abnormal returns are calculated for 11 day observa-
tion period [-4,+6] as follows (MacKinlay 1997: 24): 
 
(11) ARt =  
 
 
           , 
where, N = the number of observations 
 ARt = the sample average of the N abnormal returns 
 ARit = the abnormal return for share i during time t 
 
Apart from calculating the daily abnormal returns, it is also meaningful to observe how 
returns act on a specific period. The abnormal return observations have to be aggregated 
in order to obtain cumulative abnormal returns. (Vaihekoski 2004: 233.) The cumulative 
abnormal return is a sum of the abnormal returns for an event window as follows 
(MacKinlay 1997: 24): 
 
(12) CAR(t1,t2) =  
  
        
 
where, CAR(t1,t2) = the cumulative abnormal return for an interval t1,t2 
 
4.2.3. Testing the statistical significance of abnormal returns 
 
Heikkilä (2008) suggest that testing the statistical significance consists of six phases and 
starts with placing the hypotheses and collecting the sample. As they are done the test-
ing proceeds by choosing the statistical test and performing the test. Once the results are 
obtained it is time to interpret the results and finally make the conclusions about them. 
42 
 
 
Before the researcher can generalize the results across the population, it is needed to 
confirm that the probability of the chance between the variables' dependence or differ-
ence between groups is small enough. The dependence or the difference has to be statis-
tically significant. The most commonly used significance levels are 0.1 (10 %), 0.05 (5 
%), 0.01 (1 %) and 0.001 (0,1 %) which are also used in this study. The smaller the sig-
nificance level, the more significant the result. (Heikkilä 2008: 190, 194–195.) 
 
In this study, t-test is used for testing the statistical significance of the abnormal returns. 
The statistical significance of both the daily average abnormal returns and the cumula-
tive abnormal returns are researched. The t-test measures whether the abnormal returns 
differ from their expectation value that is zero in this study. The two-tailed t-test is used 
in this study because the abnormal returns can be either positive or negative (Heikkilä 
2008: 198.): 
 
(13) t =  
    
 
  
 
 
where,   = the sample mean 
 µ0 = the expectation value 
 s = the standard deviation of the sample 
 n = the amount of observation 
 
The standard deviation of the sample is calculated as follows (Heikkilä 2008: 86): 
 
(14) s =  
         
 
   
   
 =   
   
  
      
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
As explained in the data description (see chapter 4.1.) the observations are divided into 
different portfolios based on the hypotheses of this study. The daily average abnormal 
returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns are calculated separately to each 
portfolio. Additionally, the returns between different portfolios are compared. The t-test 
can be used to test the means of two independent groups. The condition is that the va-
riables are normally distributed which means that the abnormal returns under observa-
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tion are assumed to be normally distributed. The t-test for two independent samples can 
be calculated with equation 15 (Heikkilä 2008: 230, 314): 
 
(15) t = 
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
In this chapter the empirical findings regarding permanent layoff announcements’ im-
pact on stock prices are presented and discussed. First the average abnormal returns 
caused by permanent layoff announcements for the whole sample are presented. The 
second part focuses on inter-industry differences. The sample of 257 layoff announce-
ments is divided into subsamples based on in which of the three chosen industries the 
company operates. Finally, the last part consists of the results about how the market 
reacts to layoff announcements given during different business cycles. Furthermore, the 
differences in average abnormal returns between upturn and downturn periods are dis-
cussed. The results are achieved by using the models that are presented in the previous 
chapter. All average abnormal returns are calculated on daily basis, cumulatively and in 
intervals. 
 
 
5.1. Whole sample 
 
Table 1 shows the average abnormal returns caused by a permanent layoff announce-
ment for the whole sample covering the years 2006–2011 and including 257 observa-
tions. According to the results, permanent layoff announcements do not cause statisti-
cally significant abnormal returns within the event window. P-statistics indicate that the 
returns are not significantly different from zero either around the announcement or at 
the announcement day. Cumulative abnormal returns are mainly positive but quite non-
existent. 
 
As there are no statistically significant abnormal returns around the event day it seems 
that the Finnish stock market is efficient and new information is adapted effectively to 
the stock price. However, in order for the semi-strong form of market efficiency to be 
fulfilled a new piece of information - in this case a company's final layoff announce-
ment - should be reflected into the share price on the announcement day causing either 
positive or negative abnormal return. The abnormal return on the event day is -0,14 per-
cent but it is not statistically significant. Based on these results it seems that the semi-
strong form is not fulfilled in the Finnish stock market when observing the whole sam-
ple because a layoff announcement does not cause significant abnormal return on the 
event day. 
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Table 1. Average abnormal returns for the whole sample. Amount of observations 
N=257. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Statistically significant at level 0.01, ** Statistically significant at level 0.05, * Sta-
tistically significant at level 0.1 
 
Where, 
AR = Average abnormal return on specified day 
CAAR = Average cumulative abnormal return on specified day 
p statistic = Level of statistical significance 
 
Figure 8 illustrates graphically both average abnormal returns and cumulative average 
abnormal returns during the investigation period. It seems that there is no rationality in 
the abnormal returns. Both the average abnormal returns and the average cumulative 
abnormal returns for the whole sample are unsteady and the returns vary from positive 
to negative. However, the fluctuation is slight and the changes vary within 0,5 percent. 
 
The results for the whole sample do not give statistically significant support for the first 
hypothesis according to which a final layoff announcement should cause a negative 
share price reaction. For instance Worrell et al. 1991 and Chen et al. 2001 found a nega-
tive market reaction due to a layoff announcement. These research results are partly in 
line with the previous findings because the reaction on daily basis is negative on the an-
nouncement day even though it was only a minor reaction and insignificant. 
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 0,06% 0,816 0,06% 0,816
-3 -0,02% 0,960 0,04% 0,840
-2 0,17% 0,604 0,21% 0,853
-1 0,03% 0,935 0,24% 0,837
0 -0,14% 0,657 0,10% 0,685
1 -0,01% 0,736 0,09% 0,857
2 0,12% 0,224 0,21% 0,554
3 -0,30% 0,168 -0,09% 0,982
4 0,22% 0,953 0,12% 0,998
5 -0,15% 0,372 -0,03% 0,729
6 0,36% 0,344 0,33% 0,981
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 0,24% -0,12% -0,14% -0,15% 0,24% 0,33%
p-stat 0,837 0,947 0,657 0,981 0,717 0,981
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Figure 8. Average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns for the 
whole sample. 
 
 
5.2. Inter-industry differences 
 
The whole sample is divided into three portfolios based on the findings made by Elayan 
et al. (1998). The researchers found that service-oriented companies face stronger mar-
ket reaction when announcing layoffs compared to manufacturing companies. Thus the 
three portfolios are formed: the technology portfolio, the consumption goods and ser-
vices portfolio, and the manufacturing portfolio. The companies operating in the tech-
nology industry as well as the consumption goods and services industry represent ser-
vice companies and the manufacturing industry represents non-service companies. 
 
The technology industry covers almost 50 percent of the total Finnish market share. Yet 
the sample consist of 41 permanent layoff announcements given by 14 companies. Ta-
ble 2 presents research results for the technology portfolio. The results point out that the 
stock price reaction to the given permanent layoff announcements is both positive and 
negative. More strongly the impact is positive but overall not statistically significant. 
The cumulative average abnormal return for the 11-day event window is 2,43 percent. 
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Table 2. Average abnormal returns for the technology portfolio. Amount of observa-
tions N=41. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  9. Average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns for the 
technology portfolio. 
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day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 0,02% 0,824 0,02% 0,824
-3 -0,29% 0,807 -0,27% 0,730
-2 0,07% 0,971 -0,20% 0,771
-1 0,00% 0,712 -0,20% 0,916
0 0,27% 0,458 0,07% 0,596
1 -0,45% 0,678 -0,38% 0,991
2 0,38% 0,137 0,00% 0,601
3 0,82% 0,472 0,82% 0,426
4 0,54% 0,725 1,36% 0,276
5 -0,58% 0,369 0,78% 0,646
6 1,65% 0,335 2,43% 0,281
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR -0,20% -0,18% 0,27% -0,18% 2,36% 2,43%
p-stat 0,916 0,845 0,458 0,951 0,354 0,281
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It can be noted from figure 9 that the average abnormal returns around the event day 
have varied within a 3 percent scale. The abnormal returns before the announcement 
day are close to zero which may indicate that the market is not able to predict the final 
announcement day. After the event day the stock price reaction starts to live and the ab-
normal returns occur. The drift after the permanent layoff announcement is positive ex-
cept for the day 5. The post-announcement drift implies that the new information in the 
market is not reflected perfectly into the share price at the announcement day. 
 
The consumption goods and services portfolio consists of 70 permanent layoff an-
nouncements given by 17 companies that operate in the industry in question. The results 
are presented in table 3. The stock price reaction is strongest one day before and two 
days after the final announcement when examining the abnormal returns on daily basis. 
As for the cumulative abnormal returns the reaction is best seen within days [-1,+1]. 
Overall, the abnormal returns are not particularly high but for day 2 the abnormal return 
is -0,55 percent on average and it is statistically significant at level 0.05. In addition, the 
average cumulative abnormal returns are statistically significant at level 0.05 during in-
terval [+1,+6]. These results show some evidence for the abnormal returns' statistical 
significance within the consumption goods and services industry. 
 
 
Table 3. Average abnormal returns for the consumption goods and services portfolio. 
Amount of observations N=70. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
       
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 0,55% 0,60% 0,04% 0,23% -0,56%** 0,03%
p-stat 0,699 0,556 0,857 0,950 0,021 0,253
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0,07% 0,573 -0,07% 0,573
-3 -0,05% 0,708 -0,12% 0,464
-2 0,29% 0,634 0,17% 0,834
-1 0,38% 0,411 0,55% 0,699
0 0,04% 0,857 0,59% 0,635
1 0,19% 0,919 0,77% 0,729
2 -0,55%** 0,012 0,22% 0,676
3 -0,32% 0,315 -0,09% 0,401
4 -0,02% 0,452 -0,11% 0,271
5 0,17% 0,826 0,07% 0,332
6 -0,04% 0,523 0,03% 0,253
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The average abnormal returns for the consumption goods and services portfolio are illu-
strated in figure 10. The variation of stock price starts three days before the event day 
and the cumulative abnormal return accumulates until day 1 for 0,77 percent. Next two 
days a clear decline near zero can be observed and the rest of observation days are 
steady. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  10. Average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns for the 
consumption goods and services portfolio. 
 
 
The manufacturing industry has the greatest amount of observations among the three 
selected industries with 146 permanent layoffs given by 35 companies during the 6 year 
investigation period. Table 4 presents the average abnormal returns for the manufactur-
ing industry and it shows that the average cumulative abnormal returns are positive be-
fore the event day and negative at the event day and after it but none of them are statis-
tically significant. As for the daily average abnormal returns three days after permanent 
layoff announcement occurs a statistically significant abnormal return of -0,61 percent 
at level 0.05. Likewise on day 2 an abnormal return of 0,37 percent is received with 
weak statistical significance level of 0.1. Overall, both the abnormal returns and the cu-
mulative abnormal returns during the investigation period are not high. 
 
The statistically significant average abnormal return existing on day 2 is consistent with 
the findings in the consumption goods and services industry's research results. The ab-
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normal return is negative for the consumption goods and services portfolio and positive 
for the manufacturing portfolio on the second day after the specified event. It may indi-
cate that for the consumption goods and services industry permanent layoffs are inter-
preted as negative news and for the manufacturing as positive news. This finding is con-
sistent with Elayan et al.'s (1998) finding about service-oriented companies suffering 
more than manufacturing companies in case of layoff announcements. However, it is 
hard to draw conclusions about the investor's behavior when examining the stock price 
reaction for the manufacturing industry because on the third day following the event the 
reaction is opposite i.e. negative. 
 
 
Table 4. Average abnormal returns for the manufacturing portfolio. Amount of observa-
tions N=146. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in figure 11 where the stock price reaction for the manufacturing portfo-
lio is illustrated, both the average abnormal returns and the average cumulative abnor-
mal returns fluctuate and do not have any conformity. On days 2 and 3 when statistical-
ly significant average abnormal returns are obtained the stock price reaches its highest 
as well as lowest points within the 11-day event window. The average cumulative ab-
normal returns are positive before the event day and the rest of the period they stay neg-
ative.  
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 0,21% -0,46% -0,34% -0,32% 0,02% -0,11%
p-stat 0,989 0,900 0,942 0,951 0,866 0,935
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 0,13% 0,877 0,13% 0,877
-3 0,07% 0,996 0,20% 0,918
-2 0,15% 0,711 0,34% 0,867
-1 -0,14% 0,789 0,21% 0,989
0 -0,34% 0,942 -0,13% 0,964
1 0,02% 0,999 -0,11% 0,966
2 0,37%* 0,099 -0,35% 0,843
3 -0,61%** 0,028 -0,12% 0,860
4 0,23% 0,959 -0,12% 0,860
5 -0,19% 0,654 -0,31% 0,759
6 0,20% 0,516 -0,11% 0,935
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Figure  11. Average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns for the 
manufacturing portfolio. 
 
 
The results obtained when observing the industries separately did not give unambiguous 
evidence about the inter-industry differences. As given permanent layoff announce-
ments are focused on the manufacturing industry (see figure 5), and more importantly in 
order to test whether the same reaction is observed in the Finnish market as Elayan et al. 
(1998) found in the U.S. market, a new portfolio is formed. The new portfolio consists 
of companies that are operating in the technology and in the consumption goods and 
services industries. The combined portfolio is called service-oriented companies portfo-
lio and it features 111 announcements. The combined portfolio is built in order to test 
does Elayan et al.'s (1998) finding about the difference in market reaction exist in the 
Finnish stock market i.e. whether the stocks in the service-oriented companies react 
more strongly to permanent layoff announcements than the manufacturing industry's 
stocks. 
 
A comparison of average abnormal returns between the service-oriented companies 
portfolio and the manufacturing portfolio is shown in table 5. As it can be noted from 
the results there are no remarkable differences between the two portfolios under obser-
vation. There is only one statistically approximate average abnormal return of -0,58 per-
cent (significant at level 0.1) during the 11-day event window and it occurs two days 
after the final layoff announcement. On the release day of the announcement the ser-
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vice-oriented companies portfolio faces 0,47 percent stronger positive abnormal return 
on average than the manufacturing portfolio but the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. The average cumulative abnormal returns point out that for days -4 to -2 the dif-
ference is negative and for the rest of the observation days it is positive except for day 2. 
An abnormal return of 1,03 percent is accumulated for the whole period. 
 
 
Table 5. Differences in average abnormal returns between the service-oriented compa-
nies portfolio and the manufacturing portfolio. Amount of observations in the manufac-
turing portfolio N=146 and in the service-oriented companies portfolio N=111. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average cumulative abnormal returns for the service-oriented companies portfolio 
(see appendix 2 for research results of the service-oriented companies portfolio) and the 
manufacturing portfolio are graphically presented in figure 12. It can be seen that the 
market reaction caused by a permanent layoff announcement is reverse for the two port-
folios. Where the market reaction for the manufacturing portfolio is positive, it is nega-
tive for the service-oriented companies portfolio and whereas it is negative for the man-
ufacturing portfolio, it is positive for the service-oriented companies portfolio. Both 
portfolios have their greatest leaps before the event. The abnormal returns for the manu-
facturing portfolio decrease before the event day and after the returns remain somewhat 
stable for rest of the investigation period. The abnormal returns for the service-oriented 
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0,16% 0,633 -0,16% 0,633
-3 -0,21% 0,468 -0,38% 0,395
-2 0,07% 0,860 -0,31% 0,600
-1 0,37% 0,316 0,06% 0,928
0 0,47% 0,201 0,53% 0,467
1 -0,07% 0,884 0,46% 0,605
2 -0,58%* 0,094 -0,12% 0,900
3 0,71% 0,145 0,59% 0,581
4 -0,04% 0,934 0,55% 0,599
5 0,08% 0,861 0,64% 0,574
6 0,39% 0,405 1,03% 0,360
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 0,06% 0,77% 0,47% 0,40% 0,50% 1,03%
p-stat 0,928 0,249 0,201 0,493 0,557 0,360
53 
 
companies portfolio on the other hand start to increase three days before the event and 
after the announcement they vary a little before they leap to reach their highest value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Average cumulative abnormal returns for the service-oriented companies 
portfolio and the manufacturing portfolio. 
 
 
In their study Elayan et al. (1998) found that service industry firms were more negative-
ly affected by a layoff announcement compared to manufacturing industry firms. Based 
on the aforementioned finding the second research hypothesis was built and it stated 
that there is a difference in the market reaction caused by a final layoff announcement 
between the chosen industries. These results provide only weak support for the second 
hypothesis as there are differences in the market reaction between the service-oriented 
companies portfolio and the manufacturing portfolio. On the second day after the event 
day service-oriented companies portfolio faces -0,58 percent stronger negative abnormal 
return at significance level 0.1 than manufacturing portfolio. 
 
 
5.3. Business cycle portfolios 
 
Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995) and Chatrath et al. (1995) have noted in their stu-
dies that different economical situations may have an impact on stock price reaction 
caused by a final layoff announcement. Elayan et al. (1998) found that a layoff an-
nouncement given during a downturn period causes a more negative market reaction 
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compared to one given during an upturn period. The third hypothesis in this study re-
lates to the business cycles and the difference in the market reaction between them. 
 
In this study upturn and downturn periods are defined based on OMX Helsinki CAP 
index. An upturn period is interpreted to change to a downturn period when the index 
reaches its highest value. Thus a downturn period is assumed to change to an upturn pe-
riod when the index reaches its lowest value. As it can be seen from figure 13 where the 
development of OMX Helsinki CAP index is illustrated four business cycles can be ob-
served within years 2006–2011. The upturn periods take place from January 2nd 2006 
until October 31
st
 2007 and from March 10
th
 2009 until February 1
st
 2011 and as for the 
downturn periods from November 1
st
 2007 until March 9
th
 2009 and from February 2
nd
 
2011 until December 30
th
 2011. 
 
The research material consists of 257 final layoff announcements and it is divided into 
two subsamples based on the business cycle during which the announcement was given 
and furthermore based on the industry in which it was given (see figure 6). 162 final 
layoff announcements were given during the economical upturn periods and respective-
ly 95 announcements took place during the downturn periods. It may seem irrational 
that there are more observations during the upturn periods than during downturn periods 
but the reason is that most negotiations concerning deduction of a workforce are started 
during a regression. Nevertheless, processes take sometimes a long time or soon after 
the beginning of negotiations markets begin to recover in which case the final decision 
is made during an upturn period. 
 
 
Figure 13. Development of OMX Helsinki CAP index during the investigation period. 
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The following subtitles provide empirical evidence on how the market reacts to layoff 
announcements given during the upturn and downturn periods for the whole sample and 
for the three chosen industries. Finally, the differences in market reactions between the 
upturn and downturn periods are presented. 
 
5.3.1. Upturn periods 
 
Table 6 shows the average abnormal returns caused by permanent layoff announce-
ments given during the upturn periods for the whole sample under observation. The re-
sults indicate only weak statistical significance with an average abnormal return of 0,65 
percent on day 6 at level 0.10. The cumulative abnormal returns are positive for the 
whole 11-day event window cumulating 1,53 percent on average. Overall, new informa-
tion in the stock market seems to have no considerable impact on stock prices when the 
whole sample is considered. 
 
 
Table 6. Average abnormal returns during upturn periods for the whole sample. 
Amount of observations N=162. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results for the technology industry during the economical upturn periods are pre-
sented in table 7 from which it turns out that the average abnormal returns on daily basis 
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 0,85% 0,37% 0,34% 0,25% 0,34% 1,53%
p-stat 0,528 0,874 0,242 0,888 0,992 0,441
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 0,14% 0,932 0,14% 0,932
-3 0,18% 0,416 0,32% 0,627
-2 0,40% 0,235 0,72% 0,269
-1 0,13% 0,558 0,85% 0,528
0 0,34% 0,242 1,19% 0,233
1 -0,10% 0,524 1,09% 0,554
2 0,17% 0,521 1,26% 0,406
3 -0,35% 0,113 0,91% 0,905
4 0,26% 0,469 1,17% 0,608
5 -0,30% 0,299 0,88% 0,988
6 0,65%* 0,074 1,53% 0,441
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are negative but close to zero before the event day. The greatest abnormal return of 2,69 
percent is discovered on the last day of the event window. However, none of the aver-
age abnormal returns are statistically significant hence the results cannot be generalized. 
On the other hand it is necessary to point out that there are no more than 24 permanent 
layoffs given by companies working in the field of technology during the upturn periods 
whereupon the results can be volatile. 
 
 
Table 7. Average abnormal returns during upturn periods for the technology portfolio. 
Amount of observations N=24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows the average abnormal returns for the consumption goods and services 
industry. According to the results, two days after the announcement day there exists a 
statistically significant abnormal return and it is -0,6 percent on average at the signific-
ance level of 0.05. This research result is in line with the result gotten when observing 
the average abnormal returns for the same industry but including all the layoff an-
nouncements given within the investigation period of six years. 
 
 
 
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR -1,37% -0,27% 1,15% 0,09% 1,67% 1,45%
p-stat 0,172 0,608 0,243 0,795 0,337 0,713
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0,01% 0,933 -0,01% 0,933
-3 -0,73% 0,329 -0,74% 0,523
-2 -0,27% 0,538 -1,01% 0,400
-1 -0,36% 0,296 -1,37% 0,172
0 1,15% 0,243 -0,22% 0,564
1 -1,06% 0,508 -1,28% 0,359
2 0,36% 0,451 -0,93% 0,534
3 0,30% 0,477 -0,63% 0,723
4 1,12% 0,592 0,49% 0,882
5 -1,72% 0,271 -1,23% 0,415
6 2,69% 0,154 1,45% 0,713
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Table 8. Average abnormal returns during upturn periods for the consumption goods 
and services portfolio. Amount of observations N=48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The manufacturing industry represents the last sample when focusing on the market 
reaction caused by a final layoff announcement given during the upturn periods and it 
provides the most noteworthy results so far. As it can be seen from table 9 statistically 
significant abnormal returns appear both in average abnormal returns and average cu-
mulative abnormal returns as well as both before and after the announcement day. How-
ever, there are no significant average abnormal returns on the announcement day nor 
within the chosen intervals. 
 
What is notable is that the daily average abnormal return on the event day is only 0,25 
percent and it is not statistically significant. The average abnormal returns are statisti-
cally significant at level 0.05 three days before (0,55 %) and three days after (-0,76 %) 
the announcement. Also on day 2 occurs an average abnormal return of 0,54 percent at 
level 0.1. As for the average cumulative abnormal returns the returns are throughout the 
event window positive but the statistically significant abnormal returns are gained two 
days before and two days after the final layoff announcement day. A cumulative abnor-
mal return of 1,31 percent on average is significant at level 0.1 on day -2 and on day 2 
average cumulative abnormal return is 2,18 percent at significance level of 0.05. 
 
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 0,90% 0,78% 0,13% 0,35% 0,01% 1,04%
p-stat 0,818 0,623 0,711 0,729 0,233 0,785
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 0,01% 0,590 0,01% 0,590
-3 -0,06% 0,574 -0,05% 0,411
-2 0,52% 0,407 0,47% 0,969
-1 0,43% 0,723 0,90% 0,818
0 0,13% 0,711 1,03% 0,643
1 0,23% 0,915 1,25% 0,680
2 -0,6%** 0,018 0,65% 0,687
3 0,08% 0,863 0,73% 0,661
4 -0,04% 0,709 0,69% 0,599
5 0,20% 0,635 0,88% 0,704
6 0,15% 0,689 1,04% 0,785
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Table 9. Average abnormal returns during upturn periods for the manufacturing portfo-
lio. Amount of observations N=90. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All things considering it seems that the new information that final layoff announce-
ments bring to the stock market is not reflected perfectly and without delay to the stock 
prices in the manufacturing industry because statistically significant abnormal returns 
appear after the event day. In addition, there are also statistically significant average ab-
normal returns two days before the announcement which may indicate that investors are 
capable of predicting the day of the final layoff announcement. 
 
It can be concluded that these research results point out that permanent layoff an-
nouncements given during the economical upturn periods have a significant impact on 
the stock market. These results indicate strong evidence for the manufacturing industry 
and suggestive evidence for the subsample as a whole and for the consumption goods 
and services industry. The technology portfolio alone did not provide a support for the 
matter. The statistically significant abnormal returns are both positive and negative. The 
average cumulative abnormal returns are mainly positive during the upturn periods for 
the whole subsample, the consumption goods and services industry, and the manufactur-
ing industry. However, for the technology industry the market reaction for permanent 
layoff announcements is mainly negative. 
 
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 1,41% 0,33% 0,25% 0,23% 0,15% 1,81%
p-stat 0,208 0,936 0,494 0,754 0,987 0,372
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 0,25% 0,804 0,25% 0,804
-3 0,55%** 0,044 0,80% 0,135
-2 0,52% 0,248 1,31%* 0,073
-1 0,09% 0,580 1,41% 0,208
0 0,25% 0,494 1,65% 0,142
1 -0,01% 0,812 1,64% 0,191
2 0,54%* 0,084 2,18%** 0,049
3 -0,76%** 0,024 1,42% 0,491
4 0,20% 0,494 1,62% 0,387
5 -0,18% 0,623 1,44% 0,506
6 0,37% 0,327 1,81% 0,372
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5.3.2. Downturn periods 
 
In this chapter the average abnormal returns achieved when companies announce their 
final layoffs during the economical downturn periods are presented for the whole sam-
ple and to every chosen industry separately. It is necessary to point out that there are 
less than 100 observations in the whole subsample. Especially when it comes to the 
permanent layoffs given by companies working in the field of technology as well as in 
the consumption goods and services industry there is a limited amount of observations 
during the downturn periods whereupon the results can be biased. 
 
Table 10 presents the average abnormal returns caused by final layoff announcements 
given during the downturn periods for the whole sample under empirical examination. 
According to the research results, permanent layoffs do not seem to have an impact on 
stock returns when all three industries are considered. The average abnormal returns are 
mainly close to zero except for the event day with -0,98 percent, however it is not statis-
tically significant. The average cumulative abnormal returns are throughout the 11-day 
event window negative but none of the days gain statistically significant return. 
 
 
Table 10. Average abnormal returns during downturn periods for the whole sample. 
Amount of observations N=95. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR -0,67% -0,97% -0,98% -0,87% 0,13% -1,52%
p-stat 0,898 0,776 0,611 0,782 0,607 0,526
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0,06% 0,887 -0,06% 0,887
-3 -0,41% 0,472 -0,47% 0,557
-2 -0,10% 0,847 -0,57% 0,583
-1 -0,11% 0,399 -0,67% 0,898
0 -0,98% 0,611 -1,65% 0,716
1 0,11% 0,842 -1,54% 0,803
2 -0,09% 0,447 -1,63% 0,970
3 -0,25% 0,562 -1,88% 0,826
4 0,18% 0,366 -1,70% 0,614
5 0,13% 0,999 -1,58% 0,630
6 0,05% 0,576 -1,52% 0,526
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As for the technology portfolio, table 11 shows the average abnormal returns caused by 
permanent layoffs given during the downturn periods. The average abnormal returns 
vary from -0,98 percent on the announcement day to 1,56 percent on the third day after 
the event day. The average abnormal returns on daily basis are not noteworthy. The av-
erage cumulative abnormal returns indicate statistical significance at level 0.05 right 
after the announcement day lasting for two days. The abnormal return is cumulatively 
0,89 percent on average one day after and 1,30 percent on average two days after the 
final layoff announcement. The average abnormal return accumulates nearly 4 percent 
for the whole investigation period. 
 
 
Table 11. Average abnormal returns during downturn periods for the technology portfo-
lio. Amount of observations N=17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From table 12 the average abnormal returns can be seen for the consumption goods and 
services portfolio, and it shows that the average cumulative abnormal returns stay nega-
tive for the whole time. The final layoff announcements seem to have no significant im-
pact on the stock returns during the economical downturn periods. Only one piece of 
evidence is received when observing the cumulative abnormal returns on average within 
intervals. A statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of -1,80 percent at level 
0.05 is gained during time interval [+1,+6]. 
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 1,45% -0,06% -0,98% -0,57% 3,33% 3,81%
p-stat 0,174 0,523 0,905 0,662 0,595 0,254
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 0,05% 0,644 0,05% 0,644
-3 0,34% 0,200 0,39% 0,266
-2 0,56% 0,630 0,95% 0,321
-1 0,51% 0,675 1,45% 0,174
0 -0,98% 0,905 0,48% 0,120
1 0,41% 0,454 0,89%** 0,039
2 0,41% 0,230 1,30%** 0,047
3 1,56% 0,682 2,86% 0,128
4 -0,26% 0,678 2,59% 0,203
5 1,03% 0,771 3,63% 0,186
6 0,18% 0,336 3,81% 0,254
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Table 12. Average abnormal returns during downturn periods for the consumption 
goods and services portfolio. Amount of observations N=22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Permanent layoff announcements' impact on stock prices during the downturn periods 
for the manufacturing portfolio are presented in table 13. The results do not show any 
statistical significance among both average abnormal returns and average cumulative 
abnormal returns. The average abnormal returns stay close to zero around the event day. 
Highest yet not statistically significant abnormal return of -1,31 percent is achieved on 
the announcement day. The cumulative abnormal returns stay constantly negative reach-
ing their highest value of -3,32 percent on day 3. 
 
These research results do not strongly prove that permanent layoff announcements giv-
en during the economical downturn periods have a significant impact on the stock mar-
ket. The results indicate only extremely weak evidence for the matter. The average cu-
mulative abnormal returns are altogether negative during the downturn periods for the 
whole sample, the consumption goods and services industry and the manufacturing in-
dustry. As for the technology industry, where the most statistically significant results 
among these subsamples are achieved, the market reaction for permanent layoff an-
nouncements is positive. 
 
 
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR -0,23% 0,22% -0,14% -0,04% -1,80%** -2,17%
p-stat 0,749 0,695 0,647 0,595 0,029 0,116
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0,24% 0,812 -0,24% 0,812
-3 -0,05% 0,922 -0,29% 0,915
-2 -0,20% 0,637 -0,49% 0,726
-1 0,27% 0,289 -0,23% 0,749
0 -0,14% 0,647 -0,37% 0,877
1 0,10% 0,704 -0,27% 0,979
2 -0,44% 0,638 -0,71% 0,874
3 -1,18% 0,250 -1,89% 0,443
4 0,05% 0,444 -1,84% 0,279
5 0,12% 0,810 -1,72% 0,263
6 -0,45% 0,173 -2,17% 0,116
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Table 13. Average abnormal returns during downturn periods for the manufacturing 
portfolio. Amount of observations N=56. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned before, Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995) and Chatrath et al. (1995) 
stated that different business cycles may have an impact on a stock price reaction caused 
by a final layoff announcement. These findings do support the fact that layoffs do cause 
a market reaction. However, it is hard to make profound conclusions when the results 
for the upturn and downturn periods are presented separately. In the following subtitle 
the differences in the market reaction between different business cycles are shown in 
order to be able to find out if a layoff announcement given during the downturn periods 
causes a more negative market reaction compared to one given during the upturn pe-
riods as Elayan et al. (1998) found in their study. 
 
5.3.3. Differences between downturn and upturn periods 
 
The differences in average abnormal returns for the whole sample between the econom-
ical upturn and downturn periods are presented in table 14 from which it turns out that 
there are statistically significant differences in both the average abnormal returns and 
the average cumulative abnormal returns between the economical business cycles. The 
results reveal that the stock price reaction is negatively stronger during the downturn 
periods. On the release day the difference in the average abnormal returns between the 
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR -1,49% -1,72% -1,31% -1,28% -0,09% -2,89%
p-stat 0,431 0,903 0,698 0,711 0,784 0,354
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0,02% 0,787 -0,02% 0,787
-3 -0,78% 0,138 -0,80% 0,230
-2 -0,25% 0,799 -1,06% 0,301
-1 -0,44% 0,793 -1,49% 0,431
0 -1,31% 0,698 -2,80% 0,358
1 0,02% 0,994 -2,77% 0,408
2 -0,11% 0,738 -2,88% 0,518
3 -0,43% 0,403 -3,32% 0,348
4 0,36% 0,611 -2,96% 0,259
5 -0,14% 0,946 -3,10% 0,275
6 0,21% 0,611 -2,89% 0,354
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business cycles is -1,32 percent at significance level 0.01. A statistically significant dif-
ference in the average abnormal returns occurs also three days before the event day with 
-0,59 percent at level 0.1 
 
The average cumulative abnormal returns provide strong empirical evidence about the 
differences in the abnormal returns between the downturn and upturn periods. The aver-
age cumulative abnormal returns stay negative for the whole investigation period. Sta-
tistically significant differences start to show two days before the announcement day 
and continue significant through the investigation period. On the event day a negative 
cumulative abnormal return difference of nearly three percent is achieved at 0.001 level 
of significance. The differences in returns two days before the announcement are signif-
icant at level 0.1 and two days after at level 0.01. For the days [+3,+6] the difference is 
significant at level 0.05 except for day 5 when it is only significant at level 0.1. 
 
 
Table 14. Differences in average abnormal returns between downturn and upturn pe-
riods for the whole sample. Amount of observations in upturn N=162 and in downturn 
N=95. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**** Statistically significant at level 0.001, *** Statistically significant at level 0.01, ** 
Statistically significant at level 0.05, * Statistically significant at level 0.1 
 
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0,20% 0,611 -0,20% 0,611
-3 -0,59%* 0,076 -0,79% 0,116
-2 -0,50% 0,262 -1,29%* 0,061
-1 -0,23% 0,567 -1,52%* 0,056
0 -1,32%*** 0,001 -2,89%**** 0,001
1 0,21% 0,641 -2,63%*** 0,006
2 -0,26% 0,496 -2,90%*** 0,006
3 0,10% 0,851 -2,79%** 0,019
4 -0,09% 0,846 -2,88%** 0,015
5 0,42% 0,326 -2,45%* 0,051
6 -0,59% 0,160 -3,05%** 0,018
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR -1,52%* -1,35%** -1,32%*** -1,11%** -0,21% -3,05%**
p-stat 0,056 0,044 0,001 0,038 0,824 0,018
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Additionally when observing the differences in the average cumulative abnormal returns 
between the downturn and upturn periods within intervals it can be noted that the differ-
ences are altogether statistically significant except for interval [+1,+6]. Figure 14 illu-
strates how the stock market reacts to layoff announcements given during the upturn 
and downturn periods for the whole sample. It can be noted that in both cases the cumu-
lative abnormal returns are close to zero on the first investigation day and the difference 
between returns is minimal. However, the differences between the returns start to widen 
immediately on the second observation day. During the upturn periods the cumulative 
abnormal returns start to increase towards the end causing a positive trend whereas the 
trend is opposite during the downturn periods. Overall, the stock price reaction is nega-
tive during the downturn periods and positive during the upturn periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Average cumulative abnormal returns during upturn and downturn periods 
for the whole sample. 
 
 
Comparison of the average abnormal returns between the downturn periods and the up-
turn periods within the technology portfolio is shown in table 15. The technology port-
folio does not provide as strong evidence as the whole sample did but it can be seen that 
on the event day the difference between the daily abnormal returns is -2,13 percent on 
average and it is significant at level 0.05. Whereas the difference in the cumulative ab-
normal returns is negative for 11 days surrounding the event day when the whole sam-
ple was considered, it is positive for the technology portfolio. As for the average cumu-
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lative abnormal returns the difference (2,82 %) is statistically significant one day before 
the announcement at level 0.1. 
 
 
Table 15. Differences in average abnormal returns between downturn and upturn pe-
riods for the technology portfolio. Amount of observations in upturn N=24 and in 
downturn N=17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Average cumulative abnormal returns during upturn and downturn periods 
for the technology portfolio. 
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day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 0,06% 0,955 0,06% 0,955
-3 1,07% 0,105 1,13% 0,323
-2 0,83% 0,394 1,96% 0,234
-1 0,86% 0,318 2,82%* 0,082
0 -2,13%** 0,012 0,70% 0,644
1 1,47% 0,441 2,17% 0,362
2 0,06% 0,958 2,22% 0,420
3 1,26% 0,599 3,49% 0,365
4 -1,38% 0,506 2,10% 0,576
5 2,76% 0,169 4,86% 0,254
6 -2,51% 0,175 2,35% 0,545
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 2,82%* 0,21% -2,13%** -0,65% 1,66% 2,35%
p-stat 0,082 0,924 0,012 0,756 0,640 0,545
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Figure 15 above illustrates the differences between the average cumulative abnormal 
returns during different business cycles for the technology portfolio. The reaction to fi-
nal layoff announcements during the downturn periods is positive for the whole obser-
vation period whereas it is mainly negative during the upturn periods. The difference in 
returns is trivial on the first observation day but the difference starts to evolve directly 
after it. The developments of both periods’ returns are mirroring each other until the 
layoff announcement day. For four days following the announcement the returns mainly 
increase in both economical cycles and for the downturn periods the growth continue 
until the last observation day. On day 5 the returns during the upturn periods in the 
economy decrease over 1,5 percent causing nearly five percent difference between the 
returns. On the last observation day returns during the upturn periods increase to reach 
their highest positive value. 
 
Differences in the abnormal returns caused by a permanent layoff announcement for the 
consumption goods and services industry are presented in table 16. As seen from the 
table the differences in the daily average abnormal returns between different business 
cycles are not substantial and none of them are statistically significant. The greatest dif-
ference occurs three days after the event day but it is not statistically significant. As for 
the average cumulative abnormal returns, the differences are negative for the whole 
event window and grow towards the end of the observation period. Statistically signifi-
cant differences arise during the last four days. On days 3, 4 and 5 the differences in the 
returns are approximately -2,50 percent on average and they are significant at level 0.1. 
On the last observation day the difference is -3,21 percent at level 0.05. 
 
Figure 16 shows graphically how stock prices react to the new information, regarding 
the final layoff announcements, in the market during the upturn and downturn periods. 
The stock price reaction is negative when a layoff announcement is given during the 
downturn periods and positive when it is given during the economical upturn periods. It 
can be seen that the magnitude of the reaction is greater during the downturn periods. 
The average cumulative abnormal returns do not vary much within the first seven ob-
servation days during the downturn periods but three days after the given announcement 
the returns decline clearly and stay on the same level for the rest of the time. As for the 
reaction during the upturn periods, the cumulative abnormal returns start to increase be-
fore the event day and continue increasing until the first day after the announcement day 
after which they decrease slightly and remain stable for the rest of time. 
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Table 16. Differences in average abnormal returns between downturn and upturn pe-
riods for the consumption goods and services portfolio. Amount of observations in up-
turn N=48 and in downturn N=22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Average cumulative abnormal returns during upturn and downturn periods 
for the consumption goods and services portfolio. 
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day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0,25% 0,667 -0,25% 0,667
-3 0,00% 0,993 -0,25% 0,711
-2 -0,72% 0,158 -0,97% 0,258
-1 -0,16% 0,834 -1,13% 0,286
0 -0,27% 0,639 -1,39% 0,152
1 -0,13% 0,767 -1,52% 0,170
2 0,17% 0,691 -1,36% 0,262
3 -1,26% 0,140 -2,62%* 0,081
4 0,09% 0,846 -2,52%* 0,077
5 -0,08% 0,858 -2,61%* 0,085
6 -0,60% 0,134 -3,21%** 0,044
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR -1,13% -0,56% -0,27% -0,40% -1,81% -3,21%**
p-stat 0,286 0,556 0,639 0,584 0,128 0,044
68 
 
Finally, as for the manufacturing portfolio the differences between the downturn and 
upturn periods are shown in table 17 from which can be seen that the differences in the 
abnormal daily returns start to show already before the permanent layoff announcement 
day. The difference is -1,33 percent on average three days before the announcement and 
it is statistically significant at level 0.01. Another statistically significant difference      
(-1,55 %) among the daily abnormal returns occurs on the announcement day also at 
level 0.01. When observing the differences among the average cumulative abnormal 
returns the results indicate strong empirical evidence to support that there are significant 
differences in returns between the downturn and upturn periods. The differences be-
tween the returns are statistically significant within the event window except for the first 
observation day. As it can be seen from table 17 the differences between the business 
cycles start to show already before the announcement day. For three days before the an-
nouncement the differences are statistically significant at level 0.05. On day -1 the dif-
ference has accumulated to -2,90 percent. On the event day the difference is as much as 
-4,45 percent and it is significant at level 0.001. On following days after the announce-
ment the differences in returns stay statistically significant at level 0.01 and the differ-
ence is approximately -4,50 percent. 
 
 
Table 17. Differences in average abnormal returns between downturn and upturn pe-
riods for the manufacturing portfolio. Amount of observations in upturn N=90 and in 
downturn N=56. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0,27% 0,638 -0,27% 0,638
-3 -1,33%*** 0,009 -1,60%** 0,035
-2 -0,77% 0,249 -2,37%** 0,021
-1 -0,53% 0,342 -2,90%** 0,015
0 -1,55%*** 0,009 -4,45%**** 0,001
1 0,04% 0,949 -4,42%*** 0,002
2 -0,65% 0,251 -5,06%*** 0,001
3 0,33% 0,529 -4,74%*** 0,003
4 0,16% 0,756 -4,58%*** 0,004
5 0,04% 0,940 -4,54%*** 0,006
6 -0,15% 0,768 -4,69%*** 0,008
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR -2,90%** -2,05%** -1,55%*** -1,52%** -0,24% -4,69%***
p-stat 0,015 0,022 0,009 0,024 0,831 0,008
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Figure 17 illustrates the differences between the cumulative abnormal returns caused by 
a final layoff announcement given to the stock market in the upturn and downturn pe-
riods. As it can be noted the reactions are opposite. The reaction is stronger during the 
downturn periods and it is negative whereas the market reaction during the upturn pe-
riods is positive. The differences in the returns increase on the announcement day and 
remain quite stable until the end of the event window. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Average cumulative abnormal returns during upturn and downturn periods 
for the manufacturing portfolio. 
 
 
When calculating the difference between the abnormal returns caused by the permanent 
layoff announcements during the downturn and upturn periods it can be clearly con-
cluded that there are statistically significant differences in the market reactions. These 
results are in line with Elayan et al.'s (1998) findings indicating that layoff announce-
ments given during downturn periods are reflected more negatively in to the stock pric-
es compared to ones given during upturn periods. For the whole sample, the consump-
tion goods and services portfolio, and the manufacturing portfolio the market reaction 
was solely negative. As for the technology portfolio the market reaction on the an-
nouncement day was negative but the cumulative abnormal return one day before the 
event day was positive but only at significance level 0.1. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to find out whether permanent layoff announcements 
cause market reactions in the Finnish stock market. In addition, the aim was to study 
whether there are differences in market reactions across industries and business cycles. 
Furthermore, one point of view was to examine if Fama's semi-strong form of market 
efficiency is fulfilled in the Finnish market. The investigation period covered years 
2006–2011 during which 257 final layoff announcements were given by 66 companies 
operating in one of the selected industries. 146 of the announcements were given in the 
manufacturing industry, 70 in the consumption goods and services industry, and 41 in 
the technology industry. 
 
In the beginning of this study a short introduction into the subject was given as well as 
the purpose of the study and the three research hypotheses were built in order to create a 
basis for this study. The introduction chapter also included the contribution of this study 
and recapping the structure that the study followed. The second chapter built a basis for 
the empirical part as some of the previous studies concerning layoff announcements’ 
impact on stock price reaction were presented. This part covered studies about the sub-
jects discussed in the part of hypotheses' formation. The third chapter consisted of the 
theoretical part which created a framework for the empirical part. Fama's efficient mar-
ket hypothesis was introduced as well as two commonly used economic models for 
stock valuation. The next two chapters included the empirical part of this thesis. First, in 
chapter four, the data was presented and its classification based on the research hypo-
theses was made. The event study methodology was introduced and finally it was fol-
lowed by the research results obtained by using the selected methods. 
 
Based on the research results it can be noted that the findings were not completely un-
ambiguous. These findings partly supported the research hypotheses and the previous 
studies' findings. In two hypotheses the null hypothesis was rejected and in one hypo-
thesis it was accepted. The findings also imply that the semi-strong form of market effi-
ciency does not seem to fulfill in the Finnish market. The conclusion can be made due 
to two reasons. First, as one null hypothesis is accepted it refers to that a new piece of 
information is not reflected into the stock price without a delay which is an implication 
of inefficiency in the market. Second, a new piece of information should be without a 
delay reflected into the stock price but the results show that there are statistically signif-
icant abnormal returns mainly after the announcement day and even before. 
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The first hypothesis was built to find out whether a final layoff announcement causes a 
stock price reaction. The sample to test the first hypothesis consisted of 257 observa-
tions and it represented the whole sample before the split to industries was done. A 
share's price is an indicator for the expectations of its future profit. According to the 
presented previous studies, layoff announcements are usually seen as negative news 
which leads to lowering the value of companies that announce layoffs. As per the re-
search results, investors do not react statistically significantly to a final layoff an-
nouncement in the Finnish stock market. However, the reaction on the announcement 
day was negative but as it was insignificant the null hypothesis is accepted –that is, a 
final layoff announcement does not cause a stock price reaction. Hence, this result is 
also inconsistent with the results provided by the previous studies. 
 
The second hypothesis related to the inter-industry differences and it tested whether 
stock price reactions differ across the technology, manufacturing, and consumption 
goods and services industries. The subject was approached by calculating the results to 
each industry separately and also forming a new portfolio in order to obtain differences 
in abnormal returns between service-oriented companies and manufacturing companies. 
The new portfolio consisted of the companies operating in the field of technology as 
well as the consumption goods and services. 
 
The technology portfolio alone did not provide statistically significant evidence about 
layoff announcements impact on stock price reaction. The consumption goods and ser-
vices portfolio provided some support for the matter because the negative daily average 
abnormal return two days after the event day was statistically significant at level 0.05. 
The market also reacted during interval [+1,+6]. Statistically significant average abnor-
mal returns occurred two and three days after the announcement day in the manufactur-
ing portfolio. The reaction was positive two days after and negative three days after the 
event. When observing the differences between the abnormal returns for the service-
oriented companies portfolio and the manufacturing portfolio, only weak support was 
received. Negative average abnormal return is obtained two days after the announce-
ment but only at significance level 0.1. Overall, it can be concluded that there are inter-
industry differences and thus the null hypothesis for the second hypothesis is rejected    
–that is, stock price reactions caused by final layoff announcements are different be-
tween industries. 
 
The third hypothesis was about the business cycle aspect and its impact on the stock 
price reaction. The upturn and downturn periods were defined based on OMX Helsinki 
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CAP index and two upturn and two downturn periods were observed from the observa-
tion period of 2006–2011. First, abnormal returns during the upturn and downturn pe-
riods were investigated for each industry alone as well as for the whole sample. After it 
the differences between the returns of downturn and upturn periods were investigated 
for the whole sample and for each three industries. 
 
The results for the whole sample were still insignificant after splitting the observations 
according to business cycles. Even though the previous results were negligible, the dif-
ferences point out strong evidence that layoffs during the downturn periods are reflected 
more negatively to stock prices compared to ones given during the upturn periods. For 
example, the cumulative abnormal returns remain significantly negative starting two 
days before the event day and lasting until the last observation day. When observing the 
abnormal returns during the upturn and downturn periods, there are no statistically sig-
nificant reactions due to layoffs for the technology portfolio. However, the differences 
in returns reveal that on the announcement day investors react more negatively to an-
nouncements given during the downturn periods compared to ones given during the up-
turn periods. Positive average cumulative abnormal returns occur one day before the 
announcement. 
 
For the consumption goods and services portfolio, during the upturn periods one signifi-
cant and negative daily abnormal return existed on day 2 and during the downturn pe-
riods a cumulative abnormal return of -1,80 percent occurred after the announcement 
[+1,+6]. The differences also supported the hypothesis because the negative cumulative 
abnormal returns occurred on the last four observation days. In the manufacturing port-
folio, there were statistically significant abnormal returns during the upturn periods both 
in daily basis and cumulatively before and after the announcement day. On the other 
hand, during the downturn periods there were no statistically significant stock price 
reactions. The differences in reactions, when comparing returns during the downturn 
periods to returns during the upturn periods, are clear and the results provide strong evi-
dence for the manufacturing portfolio. The differences in the cumulative abnormal re-
turns are statistically significant on every observation day except for the first one and on 
the event day and after it the difference is -4,50 percent on average. In the light of these 
results the null hypothesis for the third hypothesis can be rejected based on strong evi-
dence –that is, final layoff announcements given during the economical downturn pe-
riods cause more negative stock price reactions compared to ones given during the up-
turn periods. 
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All in all, this study provided Finnish evidence about the layoff announcements' impact 
on stock price reactions. The empirical results were found that both supported the pre-
vious studies and also results that differed from the previous studies' findings. It can be 
concluded that a layoff announcement does not cause a stock price reaction when the 
whole sample alone is considered but after splitting the observations into industries and 
furthermore into business cycles a stock price reaction is observed. 
 
This study concentrated in the effect caused by a final layoff announcement. For further 
research it would be interesting to study whether there are differences in market reac-
tions between the first announcement about the reduction of the workforce -that is, a 
beginning of a co-determination negotiations- and the final layoff announcement in the 
Finnish stock market. Also, the differences found between industries may imply that 
company-specific characteristics affect how investors react to layoff announcements. 
For example a company size (small versus large companies) and an ownership structure 
(family-owned versus professionally run companies) could be interesting perspectives 
to study. Another interesting aspect would be to investigate the post-earnings an-
nouncement drift more closely. The differences in returns between the downturn and 
upturn periods pointed out that the differences stayed statistically significant for six 
days after the announcement day. The post-announcement's investigation period could 
be longer in order to research how layoff announcements impact on companies' perfor-
mance in a long-term. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Companies and stocks used in the study. 
 
Technology portfolio: 
 
Aldata Solution Oyj 
Comptel Corporation 
Digia Plc 
Elektrobit Corporation 
F-Secure Corporation 
GeoSentric Plc 
Nokia Oyj 
Okmetic Oyj 
Stonesoft Corporation 
Tectia Oyj 
Tecnotree Corporation 
Tieto Corporation  
Teleste Corporation 
Trainers' House Plc 
 
Manufacturing portfolio: 
  
ALD1V 
CTL1V 
DIG1V 
EBC1V 
FSC1V 
GEO1V 
NOK1V 
OKM1V 
SFT1V 
TEC1V 
TEM1V 
TIE1V 
TLT1V 
TRH1V 
 
 
Aspo Plc  ASU1V  
Aspocomp Group Plc  ACG1V  
Cargotec Oyj  CGCBV  
Cencorp Corporation  CNC1V  
Componenta Corporation  CTH1V  
Cramo Oyj  CRA1V  
Efore Plc  EFO1V  
Exel Composites Plc  EXL1V  
Finnlines Plc  FLG1S  
Glaston Corporation  GLA1V  
Huhtamaki Oyj  HUH1V  
Incap Corporation  ICP1V  
Kemira Oyj  KRA1V  
Kesla Oyj  KELAS  
Konecranes Plc  KCR1V  
Lassila & Tikanoja Plc  LAT1V  
Lemminkäinen Corporation  LEM1S  
Metso Corporation  MEO1V 
Metsä Board Oyj  
Neo Industrial Oyj  
METSB  
NEO1V 
Outokumpu Oyj  OUT1V  
PKC Group Oyj  PKC1V  
Ponsse Oyj  PON1V  
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Pöyry Plc  POY1V  
Ramirent Plc  
Rautaruukki Corporation  
RMR1V 
RTRKS  
Raute Corporation  RUTAV  
Revenio Group Corporation  
Ruukki Group Oyj  
REG1V  
RUG1V 
Stora Enso Oyj  
UPM-Kymmene Corporation 
Turvatiimi Corporation 
Vaisala Corporation  
Wärtsilä Corporation 
YIT Corporation 
 
STERV  
UPM1V 
TUT1V 
VAIAS 
WRT1V 
YTY1V 
 
Consumption goods and services portfolio: 
 
Alma Media Corporation 
Atria Plc 
Finnair Oyj 
Fiskars Corporation 
HKScan Oyj 
Honkarakenne Oyj 
Ilkka-Yhtyma Oyj 
Keskisuomalainen Oyj 
Kesko Corporation 
Lännen Tehtaat Plc 
Martela Oyj 
Marimekko Corporation 
Nokian Tyres Plc 
Raisio Plc 
Suominen Oyj 
Talentum Oyj 
Tiimari Plc 
 
 
 
ALN1V 
ATRAV 
FIA1S 
FIS1V 
HKSAV 
HONBS 
ILK2S 
KSLAV 
KESBV 
LTE1S 
MARAS  
MMO1V 
NRE1V 
RAIVV 
SUY1V 
TTM1V 
TII1V 
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Appendix 2. Average abnormal returns for the service-oriented companies portfolio. 
Amount of observations N=111. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
day (t) AR p-statistic for AR CAAR p-statistic for CAAR
-4 -0.04% 0.858 -0.04% 0.858
-3 -0.14% 0.928 -0.18% 0.836
-2 0.21% 0.704 0.03% 0.935
-1 0.24% 0.642 0.27% 0.719
0 0.13% 0.522 0.40% 0.477
1 -0.05% 0.672 0.35% 0.815
2 -0.21% 0.848 0.14% 0.877
3 0.10% 0.917 0.24% 0.852
4 0.19% 0.973 0.43% 0.830
5 -0.10% 0.438 0.33% 0.861
6 0.59% 0.492 0.92% 0.886
days [t1 , t2] [-4,-1] [-1,+1] [0,0] [0,+1] [+1,+6] [-4,+6]
CAAR 0,27% 0,31% 0,13% 0,07% 0,52% 0,92%
p-stat 0,719 0,830 0,522 0,984 0,725 0,886
